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NEW BRUNSWICK:  LET’S NOT WASTE A CRISIS 
Donald J. Savoie 
 
ABSTRACT 
New Brunswick is staring at a crisis in the making. The crisis is economic in nature but, unless it 
is addressed with a sense of urgency, it may well make New Brunswick increasingly difficult to 
govern. The province is confronting a host of economic challenges: a structural deficit, an aging 
population, uncertainty surrounding federal transfers, sluggish economic growth, a highly 
competitive global economy, and an inability to attract new Canadians. The paper argues that 
New Brunswick should not waste a crisis and consider doing things that it “could not do before.” 
The paper maintains that the province’s academic community has an important role to play in 
ensuring that New Brunswick does not waste the looming crisis. 
 
It is very difficult these days for students of public policy in New Brunswick to strike an optimistic note for the 
province. About the best one can say is that one ought not to waste a crisis by trying to avoid it. Crisis situations offer 
possibilities to establish a new policy agenda, restructure long standing policies and programs, and encourage citizens to 
take a stronger interest in the future of their communities. 
Given the state of the province’s fiscal situation, New Brunswick offers policy makers and citizens the 
opportunity not to waste a crisis, and we should seize the moment. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to write that the 
province’s public sector cannot be sustained at current levels and that clinging to the status quo can only turn a 
challenging situation into a full blown financial crisis. In short, the status quo is fraught with both political and economic 
dangers. 
The purpose of this paper is to take stock of New Brunswick’s political economy. I look to history and to recent 
developments to make the point that New Brunswick needs an important wrench of the wheel if it is to set a new course. 
Current circumstances cry out for a new course if we are to avoid economic stagnation, serious tensions between our 
communities, and losing some of our political and economic powers to outside forces. 
History Matters 
Stephen Harper has been much maligned in our region for his observation that Atlantic Canada has to overcome 
its “culture of defeat.” What many Maritimers overlooked was that Harper did not point the finger at Atlantic Canadians 
themselves as the root cause of this culture but, rather, at the workings of Canada’s national political institutions. He has a 
point. 
History does matter. Canada’s national political institutions have not been kind to the Maritime provinces. 
Residents of Ontario and Quebec do not like to hear this message – they prefer to think that their relative economic 
success in the past was due to their stronger entrepreneurial spirit, at least when compared with our region. I write this not 
because I want to paint my region as the whining child of the Canadian federation, but rather to make the point that 
national political institutions explain to some extent our region’s relative underdevelopment. Here, I can do no better than 
quote Margaret Conrad. She writes: “With the exception of the 1930s, out-migration has been endemic to the region since 
Confederation, a condition that, had it occurred anywhere else in Canada, would have been a signal for emergency 
measures to staunch the flow of human capital. If anything gets my dander up, it is the view, implied in many national 
debates and policies, that sustaining healthy, vibrant communities in Atlantic Canada is less important than it is in 
Quebec, Ontario or Alberta.”1 She adds that Joseph Howe, the most vocal spokesperson for Nova Scotia’s anti-
Confederation Movement, could now say: “I told you so.”2 Howe saw that our region would lack the numbers in the 
House of Commons to shape policies in its interests contrary to Ontario and Quebec. 
“National policy” became and remains code words for promoting the economic interests of Ontario and Quebec. 
Among many other developments, large public investments in canals in Ontario and Quebec in the early years of 
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Confederation speak to this reality. Though promised by the leading proponents of Confederation to encourage New 
Brunswick to support Confederation in 1867, the Chignecto canal was never built. Think also of the Trans-Canada 
Highway, the Saint-Lawrence Seaway, and the Canada-US Auto Pact. Think of Ottawa’s decision to locate all – yes, all – 
crown corporations to support the national war effort in Ontario and Quebec.3 This decision alone set the stage for 
impressive economic prosperity in Canada’s golden horseshoe and for the development of the manufacturing sector in 
central Canada. Think of continuing “national efforts” to promote east-west trade. Think of massive public investments in 
Montreal’s aerospace industry and Ottawa rushing out with both hands to save Ontario’s automobile industry in 2009. 
Think of Ottawa’s continuing desire to concentrate more and more of federal public servants in the national capital region. 
Think also of Ottawa’s inability to shape economic development policies and initiatives to accommodate regional 
economic circumstances. Former Prime Minister Paul Martin put it very well when he said, “when a regional issue arises 
in central Canada, it very quickly becomes a national issue,” but that this is not the case for other regions.4 The fact that a 
Canadian prime minister saw what we in the Maritimes have long recognized is only small consolation: it is one thing to 
recognize the problem, but it is quite another to deal with it. 
National political institutions have allowed – no, encouraged – the above noted developments. The Senate, for 
example, has never been able to provide a regional offset to the representation by population of the House of Commons. 
Other federations, notably the United States, Germany, and Australia (also with a Westminster-inspired parliamentary 
system), have an upper house designed to promote the interest of the smaller provinces and states. It may surprise some 
readers to hear that serious consideration was given by the Fathers of Confederation to enshrine in the constitution that the 
Maritimes provinces would have one-third of the seats at the cabinet table.5 It is not difficult to imagine that Canada and 
the Maritime provinces would look different today if they had agreed to this. 
I am always struck by how quickly the premier of Ontario and “national” columnists working out of Ottawa are to 
react in a negative way to any suggestion of Senate reform.6  Premier McGuinty, for example, reacted to the latest efforts 
at Senate reform by insisting that “the best Senate reform would be its abolition,” essentially telling the smaller provinces 
to live with Canada’s current marital arrangements and to let the more populous provinces continue to have their way.7 It 
will be recalled, however, that McGuinty launched “a fair representation” campaign to increase the number of Ontario 
seats in the Commons in 2007 to keep pace with new seat allocations for Alberta and British Columbia.8 It will also be 
recalled that, in response to Ontario’s political pressure, Prime Minister Harper agreed to give Ontario “21 more seats in 
the House of Commons” on 17 December 2008.9 It only takes a moment’s reflection to appreciate the long-term 
implications for the three Maritime provinces. It also suggests that the premier of Ontario believes that only representation 
by population should apply in Canadian federalism, and somehow other federations have it all wrong in having an upper 
house able to speak with authority to the interests of the regions and smaller provinces. How convenient for Ontario and 
its premiers! 
But that is hardly all. Premiers of Ontario, starting with Bob Rae and continuing to this day, have been busy 
promoting “fair share” federalism for Ontario. They have again met with considerable success, not surprising given the 
province’s political clout in deciding who holds political power in Ottawa. McGuinty, for one, argued that Ottawa was 
“shortchanging Ontarians by about $1.1 billion a year in health care and higher education.”10 Ontario has long argued for 
Ottawa to shift transfer payments to the provinces for health, social services, and post-secondary education to a per capita 
basis which would, of course, again favour the more populous provinces at the expense of small have-less provinces. 
Finance minister Jim Flaherty finally agreed to the shift in his 2007 budget. He declared “starting in 2007-08 we 
will put the Canada Social Transfer payments on an equal cash basis to support post-secondary education, social 
assistance and social services equally in all provinces.” He added: “We are also committing to move the Canada Health 
Transfer to an equal per capita cash basis when the current arrangement expires in 2014.”11 Prior to the 2007 budget, 
transfers under CHST were based on three factors, including Ottawa’s estimate of the value of the tax space it 
relinquished in favour of the provinces in 1977 (that is 14.9 percent of the basic federal tax and 1 percent of taxable 
corporate income).12 The 1977 decision reflected the economic reality that the value of a tax space was greater for the 
richer provinces and that some adjustments were required to ensure somewhat comparable level of services and a degree 
of fiscal fairness across Canada. 
Again the shift to a per capita basis to calculate transfer payments clearly favours Ontario and the other more 
populous provinces. Big dogs do indeed eat first. But in the process, premiers of Ontario since the early 1990s have 
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message – Ontario is being poorly treated by Ottawa. Welcome to our world, but their case is hardly convincing. Among 
other things, it ignores history and the inherent bias of our national political and administrative institutions, thus favouring 
Ontario and Quebec. 
Ontario premiers were not alone in pointing to Ottawa to explain the province’s economic and fiscal difficulties. 
Ontario-based economists Warren Lovely and Tom Courchene came to their support and wrote about how the federal 
government was short-changing Ontario.13 Lovely argued in his “Killing the Golden Goose” article that Ottawa ran a $23 
billion operating surplus with Ontario in 2004.14 This overlooks a number of highly relevant issues. For one thing, 
progressive tax systems tend to generate more revenues from higher income individuals and regions, and no one should be 
surprised by this. That is the way progressive tax systems are designed to work. For another, it is overly simplistic, if not 
outright misleading, to simply add spending on one side and revenues on the other and declare that Ottawa is running a 
surplus in Ontario. It suggests that $1 spent on research and development in southern Ontario equals the $1 spent for an 
E.I. recipient in Cape Breton, that $1 spent on the salaries of senior federal public servants concentrated as they are in 
Ottawa equals $1 spend on a make-work project in Bouctouche, and that $1 spent on the operations of federal crown 
corporations which, for the most part, are located in Ontario and Quebec, equals $1 spent on the equalization program in 
Prince Edward Island, and the list goes on. Economists do tend to write as if history did not matter – oh! If only it could 
be that simple. 
Federal transfer payments to the Maritime provinces were designed to compensate the region for creating artificial 
east-west trade patterns that invariably favoured central Canada and the operations of national political and administrative 
institutions that were designed to deal with political problems between Upper and Lower Canada. Generous transfer 
payments to our region became a kind of guilt money from Ottawa to legitimize national policies that serve Ontario and 
Quebec well, but could never accommodate the economic circumstances of the three Maritime provinces. Ontario now 
has access to Ottawa’s guilt money, given that it too now qualifies for equalization payments. 
Funny thing about guilt money. A good number of economists from Ontario began to make the case in the early 
1980s that federal transfers and some elements of Ottawa’s regional economic development were harmful to Atlantic 
Canada.15 They created economic dependency. I bought into the arguments in my own work.16 Now that Ontario qualifies 
for federal guilt money, nothing is heard from these same economists about the dangers of dependency on federal 
transfers. The old saying often heard in Ottawa, “on policy you stand where you sit,” seems to also apply for Ontario-
based economists. 
One senses that Maritime premiers have been left on the sideline scratching their heads trying to understand this 
turn of events. While Ontario premiers have taken over their role as the whiners of the Canadian federation, Maritime 
premiers have been inexplicably silent. Perhaps they bought into the golden goose argument and hesitate to speak out on 
the issue. But what is no less puzzling is the stone silence from the departments of economics in Atlantic Canada 
universities. With some notable exceptions, we have heard precious little from our departments of economics on the 
implications that new federal fiscal arrangements hold for our region.17 
Still, one thing is certain: an agenda has been set on federal transfer payments that will shift more funds to the 
more populous provinces and less to the three Maritime provinces. Our national political institutions with an unreformed 
Senate and the new seats allocated in the Commons which will enlarge still more Ontario’s dominance on national 
political power will continue to shape policies and major initiatives that favour the heavily populated provinces. This 
agenda could also turn the three Maritime provinces into a region with the political clout of northern Ontario with 
increasingly politically marginalized premiers. 
Maritime premiers no longer seem sure how to deal with Ottawa and central Canada. Contrary to the premier of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick Premier Shawn Graham has adopted a Neville Chamberlain peace-in-our-
time with Ottawa approach. He has, for the most part, avoided confronting the prime minister publicly on federal-
provincial issues. The approach, however, has met with very little success. 
The concentration of power in the Prime Minister’s Office in Ottawa also means that we are no longer likely to 
see strong ministers from our region like in years past (Allan J. MacEachern and Roméo LeBlanc, among many others).18 
Strong Maritime ministers in the past were able to secure the odd but important economic development initiatives. I am 
thinking here, for example, of the federal government’s decision to locate its superannuation branch in Shediac. 
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In short, we are no longer the supplicants of Canadian federalism. Ontario has joined Quebec in insisting that 
Ottawa should pay still more attention to their political and economic interests. For our part, we have yet to carve out a 
role for the three Maritime provinces at the federal-provincial table. We no longer have a central message, a rallying cry 
that unites the three Maritime provinces in their dealings with Ottawa. Instead, we have adopted an every-man-for-himself 
approach as the Hydro-Quebec/NB Power deal revealed.  
What Now? 
Guilt money served at least one purpose – it enabled New Brunswick to build a public infrastructure far in excess 
of its own capacity to finance it. That money has also enabled the province’s large French-speaking minority to develop 
its own institutions. The decision to enshrine a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in our constitution, and its interpretation 
by the courts, has considerably strengthened the hand of the minority in securing its own institutions and expanding public 
services in its own language. This has had a positive impact at all levels – political, economic, and community 
development. It has also added layers to our public infrastructure which has often been financed by federal transfers. 
That said, it is difficult to make the case that federal transfer payments can lead to self-sustaining economic 
growth for our province. A healthy dynamic economy and a chronic dependence on transfer payment do not sit well 
together. In any event, given Ottawa’s shift to per capita spending on transfer payments and to other programs (see, for 
example, the stimulus package to deal with the 2008-09 economic recession), the establishment of federal regional 
development agencies patterned on ACOA in every region, including southern Ontario and Ottawa’s own difficult fiscal 
situation, we now have little choice but to lessen our dependence on federal transfers. 
New Brunswick Premier Shawn Graham captured the imagination of many New Brunswickers when he launched 
his self-sufficiency agenda within days of coming to power in 2006. Self sufficiency speaks to self-sustaining economic 
development but also to a recognition that the province will not be able to rely on federal transfer payments as it has in the 
past in developing and maintaining its public infrastructure and services. 
The Graham agenda, however, was short lived and self-sufficiency now has a bad reputation in the province. It 
will not likely hit the province’s public policy hit parade again for at least one generation. Graham quickly lost focus and 
set off in all directions, trying to fix everything that landed on his own desk, thinking somehow that every policy issue 
was linked to his self-sufficiency agenda. He set out to fix health care delivery, the French immersion program, the 
salaries of medical doctors, post-secondary education, poverty, fees for provincial ferry-goers, French-language education 
(the LeBlanc report), the economic woes of northern New Brunswick, electricity rates, and the list goes on and on. In all 
instances, he boldly put one foot forward only to step back within weeks. New Brunswick political scientist Don Desserud 
summed it up well when he said: “I think that there is a behavioural pattern with the Graham government – it jumps ahead 
and is far too rash in its plans and then has to backtrack to fix things. It’s fairly problematic.”19 
Politicians who successfully pursue a policy agenda share a number of things in common. First, they have an 
agenda, one that comes from their instincts and deeply held beliefs that also resonate with core members of their political 
parties. Second, they are able to focus on three or four key policy measures. Third, they are able to stay the course and 
stare down opposition and adversity. Think of Louis J. Robichaud on the political left and Margaret Thatcher (who 
famously said – this lady is not for turning) on the political right. 
A self-sufficiency agenda, to have any chance of success, requires single-minded purpose and an unbending focus 
on economic development. The Graham government has overhauled a number of policy areas whether or not they were 
tied to the self-sufficiency agenda. It is interesting to note, however, that it left the province’s machinery of government 
for economic development essentially intact. 
To be sure, Liberal-friendly lobbyists, communication specialists, consultants, and lawyers are more self-
sufficient today than four years ago. As for most other New Brunswickers and the state of the province’s financial 
position, the same is not true. I take some pride in reporting that I led a review of the province’s right to information 
legislation in 2007 on a volunteer basis, only asking that all the money that would have been paid to me as a consultant be 
turned over to a management development program for New Brunswick public servants. I saw this as my contribution to 
the province’s self-sufficiency agenda. 
The government of New Brunswick has turned to a myriad number of well compensated consultants in recent 
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policy initiatives outlined above. Some of these reports were very poorly researched and, by even the weakest of 
standards, were shady pieces of work. I have, over the years, read many consultant reports, given my line of work. I would 
rank the consultant report on New Brunswick’s early immersion program to be the weakest I have ever read. I have long 
wondered why no public servant in the provincial education department worked up the courage to say “no, we are not 
going to ask New Brunswick taxpayers to pay for this sub-standard work.” 
The department paid some $100,000 for the report. We have since been informed that “published e-mails between 
department staff proved that the government officials worked to shape the findings of commissioners James Croll and 
Patricia Lee.”20 If this is so, shame on the consultants and shame on the public servants. An important role of public 
servants in our Parliamentary system is to “speak truth to power.” Truth was thrown out the window, it seems, to 
accommodate political power and the consultants simply delivered what the buyers of their services wanted to hear. 
There is evidence that the provincial government has set up a parallel bureaucracy by turning to outside 
consultants to perform tasks that properly belong to the public service. A Washington-based consultant firm, for example, 
was paid to prepare a response to a paper written by a fourth-year university student who challenged the proposed Hydro-
Quebec/NB Power deal from an economic perspective. Are we to assume that there was no one in the Department of 
Finance or elsewhere in Fredericton’s Centennial Building with the background and knowledge to prepare a response to a 
fourth-year student paper? It is no longer clear what public servants occupying policy analyst positions actually do in 
Fredericton, if they are not capable of even challenging the findings of a fourth-year university student. Setting a parallel 
bureaucracy staffed by consultants can hardly make a positive contribution to the province’s self-sufficiency agenda. It is 
costly and it sends a wrong message if one is trying to promote a professional non-partisan and competent public service. 
The number of consultants hired to work on the Hydro-Quebec/NB Power deal was astounding. It seems that 
every day one heard of a new consultant firm and new communication specialists (often with close Liberal ties) retained 
to work on the deal. Given the state of the provincial government’s fiscal position, including the fact that it is running a 
deficit on its ordinary (non capital) account, the government has been using its credit card to hire consultants. To be sure, 
the province’s financial position is a great deal weaker today than in 2006. The province’s net debt is increasing to the 
tune of $1 billion a year. The steep economic recession explains the financial difficulties but so does the government’s 
decision to cut taxes and increase spending in the same budget. 
Indeed, we have witnessed new spending commitment after new spending commitment in virtually every sector, 
while important cuts were recently introduced to personal and corporate income taxes. It only takes a moment’s reflection 
to appreciate that, in public policy and public finance, this spells trouble. 
Instead of rationalizing or consolidating our public sector infrastructure, the provincial government has been 
going in the opposite direction – it is actually adding to it. For example, the provincial government recently set a 
precedent by providing financial support to the Atlantic Baptist University (renamed Crandall University). As part of 
Canada’s Knowledge Infrastructure Program (KIP), the government allocated $12 million to develop further the 
university’s infrastructure facilities.21 Premier Graham argued that it would allow “New Brunswick to continue to move to 
self sufficiency” without explaining how, or the link between the two, or how helping to finance a fifth university could 
make the province more self sufficient.22 The Federation of New Brunswick Faculty Associations was quick to oppose the 
deal. It argued: “investing $12 million of government funding in a private university takes away an equivalent amount 
from our province’s public universities.”23 
New Brunswick, with a population base of 750,000, has been relatively well served by four universities, two of 
which have satellite campuses in three communities. One can ask whether the province can continue to finance all its 
university programs, let alone provide financial support for the buildings of a fifth one. I take no satisfaction in reminding 
the reader that New Brunswick is a province with a stagnant and aging population. 
Most politicians like to increase public spending while some like to cut taxes. Politicians who like to do both will 
far more often than not lay the groundwork for a structural deficit. New Brunswick today is clearly on the road to a 
structural deficit, and a substantial one at that. Structural deficits differ from cyclical ones in important ways. Cyclical 
deficits are the product of the business cycle while structural deficits remain across business cycles because the level of 
government spending is too high for existing revenue levels. Put differently, a return to strong economic growth in New 
Brunswick will not be enough to bring the province’s books back in balance. 
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Politicians with a strong penchant for opening up the spending tap could take refuge in measures to deal with the 
2008-09 recession, and many did. Stimulus packages came in fashion throughout the Western world and parts of Asia. To 
be sure, the economic circumstances of the day shook politicians and their economic advisors. However, regions were hit 
differently with those like Ontario with its large manufacturing sector hit the hardest. Still, Canada weathered the 
economic storm better than its biggest trading partner, the United States. Atlantic Canada, in turn, also weathered the 
economic storm relatively well when compared with other regions. Atlantic Canada registered a 0.6 percent decline in 
2009 compared to 2.1 percent at the national level and is expected to register a positive gain of 1.4 percent in 2010.24 
The point is that New Brunswick did not need to open the spending tap to the extent that it has in recent years, 
and it should be quicker than other regions in turning it off. Structural deficits are not only bad economic policy, they are 
difficult to wrestle to the ground after they set in. How many times have we heard politicians talk of getting out of deficit 
in two-three years, only to see them extend the cycle? We, in New Brunswick, are now borrowing money to pay the bills, 
not to invest in a better future. More to the point, the provincial government employed its credit card to pay for the bevy 
of consultants and communication specialists that worked on a number of initiatives, notably the Hydro-Quebec/NB 
Power deal. 
Precisely at a time when a parsimonious culture should permeate all levels of the provincial government, given 
the sharp rise in the annual deficit, the growing debt, the shift of federal transfer payments to a per capita basis, and the 
province’s stagnant and aging population, the provincial government seems to be steering at full speed towards the rocks. 
This adds up to a crisis in the making. 
The Challenges 
There is no shortage of challenges facing New Brunswick, and the province’s demographics, economic structure, 
and fiscal situation figure prominently among them. The New Brunswick government itself put it very well when it 
declared that the demographic challenges facing the province include low fertility rates, declining birth rates, declining 
and aging population, a significant out-migration, particularly of youth, to other provinces, and a small immigrant intake, 
well below the national share.25 
New Brunswick’s population has hovered at about 750,000 for a number of years and has seen its share of 
Canada’s population trend downward for the better part of a century. In 1971 the province’s share of Canada’s population 
was about 3 percent while today it is a little over 2 percent.26 More people move to other provinces than Canadians from 
other provinces move to New Brunswick, and this is particularly true among young people.27 
Added to the above is the province’s aging population. In 1976 the province’s median age was 25.7 years but by 
2006 it had risen to 40.8 years. In comparison, the national median age in 2006 was 38.8 years.28 It only takes a moment’s 
reflection to appreciate what an aging population means for the province’s workforce, but also for our ability to pay for 
public services. The province’s self-sufficiency task force saw this challenge clearly and observed: “To significantly 
expand our economic base and achieve self-sufficiency, New Brunswick’s population must increase by over 100,000 in 
the next two decades. That’s a net increase of roughly 5,000 people each year. New Brunswick has never experienced 
sustained population growth of that magnitude.”29 The task force tabled its report on 7 May 2007 and there is little 
evidence that the province’s population is or will soon be increasing at a rate of 5,000 a year. 
It is one thing to hope that the province’s population will witness a rapid expansion but it is quite another to 
translate that hope into reality. We know that new Canadians prefer to go where new Canadians are (i.e., Toronto, 
Montreal, and Vancouver) and Canadians prefer to move to where economic and employment opportunities exist. 
Precious few new Canadians have decided to make New Brunswick their home, thus leaving potential economic 
opportunities unrealized. 
What about New Brunswick’s economic structure? Here, too, we have an important challenge, one that should 
permeate every corner of the provincial government. Not only is our population shrinking as a proportion of the Canadian 
population, so is our economy. From 2003 to 2008, the New Brunswick economy grew by 6.7 percent. Canada’s 
economy, however, grew by 12.8 percent during the same period.30 
New Brunswick is losing manufacturing employment at a faster rate than the other nine provinces. The province 
lost 8,300 jobs in the sector between 1999-2008, a drop of 21.1 percent. By comparison, Ontario witnessed a 17.5 percent 
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New Brunswick also witnessed the slowest total employment growth of all provinces between 1999-2008 (a gain of 12.7 
percent). This compares with a gain of 16.7 percent in Nova Scotia and 22.7 percent in Manitoba.32 
It is important to note that 36 percent of the growth in employment in New Brunswick during the 1999-2008 
period was in the public sector.33 Therein lies the rub. The federal government signed a generous agreement with the 
provinces on health care in 2004, providing for 6 percent growth in spending. The agreement expires in 2013 and with 
Ottawa’s decision to shift its transfers to the provinces to a per capita basis and, given its own fiscal challenge, one can 
easily speculate that the federal government is unlikely to be as generous post-2013 or to extend the agreement at 6 
percent.34 What then for New Brunswick? 
New Brunswick cannot escape the competitive nature of the global economy. Simply put, we now live in a global 
economy and it is up to us to respond to it. We cannot ignore it because it will not ignore us, and its presence will continue 
to be felt in every city, town, village, and hamlet in the province. If we cannot compete, if we cannot improve our 
productivity performance and our capacity to innovate, we will continue to lose population and to see more and more of 
our communities close shop. To be sure, New Brunswick has important assets and strengths, but we need to engage New 
Brunswickers on the way ahead. The challenge is much too imposing to be left in the hands of a small group [because of 
previous “hands”] of political and economic elites. 
To sum up, New Brunswick has an aging work force, a stagnant population, a large and growing debt, sluggish 
economic growth when compared with other provinces, an inability to attract new Canadians, and a large public sector 
that relies on federal transfers and borrowed money to operate as it must learn to live in a highly competitive global 
economy. At the risk of sounding repetitive, this adds up to a crisis in the making, a crisis that New Brunswick should not 
waste by ignoring. Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s chief of staff, put it well when he observed: “You never want a 
serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before.”35 
What to Do? 
My purpose is not to launch a partisan attack on the sitting government. This is not about scoring points for the 
Liberal or the Progressive Conservative party, nor is it about partisan politics. Readers who see a partisan pitch in this 
paper will miss the point entirely. For one thing, the situation is much too serious to hurl partisan attacks at one another. 
For another, I recognize that both major parties in the province will happily embrace partisan tactics to score political 
points – that is what political parties do. On this point, history suggests that neither major political party in New 
Brunswick can claim the high ground. Political institutions are fuelled by partisan politics and the road to political power 
is through partisan politics. That is the nature of parliamentary democracy, and it is not about to disappear. 
Though partisan politics will invariably play a part in debating potential solutions, I do not think that partisan 
politics alone can address New Brunswick’s emerging crisis. In short, New Brunswickers need to give a helping hand to 
our politicians, no matter their party affiliation. I write this because political life has become extremely demanding. We 
expect a great deal from our politicians and we impose a number of constraints on their work. For the most part, it is a 
thankless occupation made even more difficult by far greater transparency requirements and by a much more aggressive 
and persuasive media than in years past. Twenty-four hour news channels, right to information legislation, the end of 
deference in society, and the increasing horizontal and complex nature of public policy issues have transformed politics 
from the art of the possible to the art of survival. It is increasingly difficult to attract individuals away from the safety of 
the business world, academe, and the public service to the “no holds barred” world of politics where private life is no 
longer possible. 
The important point is that politicians, whatever their party affiliation, need our help in shaping tomorrow’s 
public policy agenda for New Brunswick. The challenges are great and impossible to meet without public support. New 
Brunswickers should not be content to sit on the sidelines simply hurling criticism and at times insults at our politicians, 
as I have too often seen and heard in recent months. The situation calls for a sober and well-informed debate and the 
involvement of citizens if we are to do things that we “think that we could not do before.” Put differently, to do things that 
we “think that we could not do before” requires a new mindset in shaping public policy and a recognition that politicians 
working alone, however well intentioned, will not suffice. The public uproar over the government’s decision to sell New 
Brunswick Power to Hydro-Quebec speaks to this new reality. Indeed, the NB Power/Hydro-Quebec deal will go down in 
history as a turning point in provincial politics, providing numerous lessons learned about how to introduce change or a 
major initiative. One hopes that both politicians and citizens have learned from that experience. 
JOURNAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK STUDIES                                                                                      Issue 1 (2010) 
 
 
http://w3.stu.ca/stu/sites/jnbs/  61 
I note, however, with more than passing concerns that the leaders of both major political parties in the weeks 
leading up to the 2010 provincial election campaign pledged not to raise taxes while making new spending commitments. 
This is simply not realistic and it is certain that some backtracking will be necessary once the election is over. Politicians 
will then wonder why there is so much cynicism towards the province’s political class. They need to be reminded that 
citizens are today better educated than, say, thirty years ago, and old-style politics only fuels cynicism towards the 
political class. 
Political leaders also have to deal with a new political reality which is being fuelled by a kind of populist anger. 
The great recession 2008-10 led many to conclude that economic and political elites and technocrats, including those 
working in central banks and governments, are no longer up to the task. It seems that citizens are insisting for still more 
consultations, transparency, and accountability, convinced that they should no longer take a back seat to anyone in 
shaping new policies or major initiatives. 
Simply put, politicians can no longer operate in relative isolation to shape major initiatives at a time when the 
challenges ahead for New Brunswick cry out for a series of major initiatives. The politics of New Brunswick is further 
complicated by the existence of two major language groups. To be sure, it is New Brunswick’s greatest asset but it also 
requires extra care and effort in shaping major policy initiatives. 
The above was brought home one year ago when I wrote an op. ed. in the Telegraph Journal that pointed to the 
province’s difficult fiscal position and that difficult decisions would soon be required to deal with it. An Acadian 
nationalist wrote to say that my piece was playing into the hands of the province’s English majority and that I should stick 
to writing books about politics in a global setting. His fear, as I understood it, was that the majority will see the need to cut 
spending as reason enough to cut into French-language services and French-language institutions. 
I reject this thinking out of hand. New Brunswick has matured a great deal since the days of Leonard Jones and 
the Confederation of Regions (COR) party. One only has to look at the reaction of many English New Brunswickers when 
the Graham government sought to eliminate the province’s French early immersion program. It was a group of English 
New Brunswickers that led the charge against the government’s decision and who took the government to court on this 
issue.36 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms also guarantees a number of rights to anglophones in Quebec and 
francophones outside Quebec. 
How, then, can New Brunswick promote economic development and establish an equilibrium between our public 
services and our ability to pay? In my view, we have little chance of doing things that we “think that we could not do 
before” unless we launch an information campaign to inform New Brunswick of the challenges ahead. This campaign 
must be open, transparent, and strictly non-partisan to have any chance of success. It should not be launched or supported 
by the provincial government and its only purpose would be to inform, not to stake out policy positions. It should be left 
to others, notably political parties and interest groups, to stake out policy positions for New Brunswickers to consider. It 
may well be, however, that a properly prepared information campaign will lead New Brunswickers to a certain conclusion 
on the way ahead but that will be for New Brunswickers to decide. 
New Brunswickers need to be informed in a detached and objective fashion on the state of the New Brunswick 
economy and the province’s fiscal situation. We need to address a number of fundamental questions. We need to ask how 
can New Brunswick compete in the global economy and how can New Brunswick increase productivity, research and 
development activities, innovation, and strengthen its work force? We need to explore the state of cooperation between 
the three Maritime provinces. How can we break down l’esprit de clocher that has long plagued the Maritime provinces? 
What can New Brunswick do to adjust to new environmental requirements? What role can New Brunswick and its 
maritime partners play to make national political and administrative institutions more sensitive to regional circumstances? 
What decisions are required to bring the province’s fiscal position back in balance? If we are to rationalize publicly-
supported institutions from hospitals, to schools and universities, how best can we involve New Brunswickers in the 
decision-making process? These are difficult questions, but they need to be addressed if we are to do “things that we think 
we could not do before.” 
Universities should play a lead role in organizing the information sessions. I have long believed that we, in the 
academic community, have a responsibility to share our knowledge and insights. We hold a privileged position in society 
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academic community need to assume this responsibility with a sense of urgency. Our province is entering a very difficult 
period in its history, and we need to lend a helping hand by reaching out to our fellow citizens. 
I conclude by congratulating Tony Tremblay at St. Thomas University and his editorial team for leading the 
charge in establishing a Journal of New Brunswick Studies/Revue d’études sur le Nouveau-Brunswick. This is an 
important step. We will need the full participation of leading academics in the province and many interested New 
Brunswickers who are willing to get involved to ensure that this time “New Brunswick should not let a crisis go to waste.” 
There are a number of ways for the province’s academic community to lend a hand. The means of 
communications are today highly accessible to the vast majority of New Brunswickers so that the academics can reach out 
to them with a minimum of efforts. There is no reason, for example, why academics from New Brunswick universities 
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